Let’s be clear about our objectives in striking Iraq. We’re not trying to invade and crush the country. We’re merely trying to point out to Saddam Hussein that unless he complies with the United Nations, then he must expect retribution-in the form of force. This is the only language he understands. Now the ball is very much in Saddam’s court.
Any further military provocation by Saddam should be met by military force without further diplomatic warnings, in my view. The warning period is now over, and if he wants to test the frontiers of the U.N. resolve, then he’s found them. Anything further must result in an immediate and repeated military response against the military forces he deploys against coalition forces.
It was right and proper to give him due warning that we intend to use real force if necessary. It would not be right and proper to have aircraft ranging all over Iraq this week taking out major targets, setting back the economy and making the life of the people of Iraq more uncomfortable than it already is. But if he doesn’t listen to the lesson put across in these attacks, then the coalition and the United Nations will have to look at wider military options.
We need to be careful in choosing the target for any further strikes. Some have argued that we should bomb Saddam’s telecommunications. But he would rebuild those very quickly, and I suspect he’s got backup facilities that probably didn’t exist prior to the war. He’ll have learned that lesson. And to take on strategic targets of that nature would require a massive increase in the use of force, a substantial extension of U.N. authority-and probably an increase in the force levels in the theater. One also hears talk about striking the Republican Guard and going for other strategic targets in Baghdad. I think that depends on what Saddam is doing to provoke such a move and what we’d hope to achieve-in terms of our limited objectives at this point-by bombing Baghdad as opposed to those targets specifically threatening our forces below the 32d parallel.
We must wonder why Saddam allowed his taunting to go so far as to force the United Nations to authorize force. It may be, as so often in the past, that it was pure misjudgment: he got to the edge of the cliff and didn’t realize that he was about to step over it. But I believe there is a danger that he sees this military action as a means of projecting himself onto the world stage and the Arab stage in particular, so that he can be seen as challenging America and the West. He aims to pose as a boxer taking a beating in the ring: he may be down on his knees, but he’s capable of getting back up and taking more punishment. And in the end the crowd will love him for his courage and his ability to stand up to what he would have you believe is the bully.
We should be very conscious that this kind of theater could lead to his gaining support in substantial sections of the Islamic world. This is a problem we must address every time we use force. America is the core of the U.N.’s ability to actually do anything. But it’s the United Nations that’s got to make the strategic decisions. We must not allow our own Western or nationalist wishes to drive us ahead on a course that does not have U.N. and Arab support.
There’s also a danger that personal animosity for Saddam could cloud our judgment. We’re close to crossing over that line, and we will cross over it unless we are prepared to ensure that we have U.N. support for any military force in the future, as we’ve had on this occasion. By implication, that includes the crucial support of the Arab world. The Arabs are the people who have to live there. Without them, the U.N. would be severely undermined. I do believe that since the end of the war there’s been a weakening of the Arabs’ resolve to coordinate their own defense forces so that they’re better able to protect themselves. I would like to see a more positive move toward a more coordinated Arab defense capability, taking place under the umbrella of what’s going on at the moment, which is largely American-led.
People question whether the job of the gulf war, the job in Iraq, is finished. Let me answer like this. The political and military objectives that were established when Desert Shield and Desert Storm forces were deployed have been fulfilled completely and unambiguously. We’ve moved on to a different mission, the humanitarian supervision of minorities in Iraq-the Kurds and Shiites. We mustn’t muddle the two missions. The humanitarian objectives have yet to be achieved.
I wouldn’t presume to give advice to an American president who has the information he needs at his fingertips-resources I don’t have-to help him do his job. I would only say, as an observer of world affairs, that the one stabilizing influence in the world today is the power and the common sense of America. If that were to be removed, then the level of unrest throughout the world would increase beyond all imagination. I would look with horror and foreboding on any suggestion that America should back off the world stage.
